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Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association Report
MAJOR INVESTOR LOSSES DUE TO CONFLICTED ADVICE:
BROKERAGE INDUSTRY ADVERTISING CREATES THE
ILLUSION OF A FIDUCIARY DUTY
Misleading Ads Fuel Confusion,
Underscore Need for Fiduciary Standard
Joseph C. Peiffer and Christine Lazaro
Executive Summary
No national standard exists today requiring brokerage firms to put their
clients’ interests first by avoiding making profits from conflicted advice. In the
five years since the passage of the Dodd Frank Act, inaction by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) on a fiduciary standard has cost American
investors nearly $80 billion, based on estimated losses of $17 billion per year.
Amid encouraging recent signs of possible action from the Department of
Labor and the SEC, there is a compelling case to be made for a ban on
conflicted advice in order to protect investors. In the absence of such a
standard, brokerage firms now engage in advertising that is clearly calculated
to leave the false impression with investors that stockbrokers take the same
fiduciary care as a doctor or a lawyer. But, while brokerage firms advertise as
though they are trusted guardians of their clients’ best interests, they arbitrate
any resulting disputes as though they are used car salesmen.
A review by the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association (PIABA) of
the advertising and arbitration stances of nine major brokerage firms – Merrill
Lynch, Fidelity Investments, Ameriprise, Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley,
Allstate Financial, UBS, Berthel Fisher, and Charles Schwab – finds that all
nine advertise in a fashion that is designed to lull investors into the belief that
they are being offered the services of a fiduciary.
For example, Merrill Lynch advertises as follows: “It’s time for a financial
strategy that puts your needs and priorities front and center.” Fidelity
Investments appeals to investors with these words: “Acting in good faith and
taking pride in getting things just right. The personal commitment each of us
makes to go the extra mile for our customers and put their interests before our
own is a big part of what has always made Fidelity a special place to work and
do business.”
Nonetheless, all nine brokerage firms using the fiduciary-like appeals in
their ads eschew any such responsibility when it comes to battling investor
claims in arbitration. Adding to the confusion is the fact that five of the eight
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brokerage firms – Ameriprise, Merrill Lynch, Fidelity, Wells Fargo, and
Charles Schwab – have publicly stated that they support a fiduciary standard.
But these firms are every bit as vociferous as the other four brokerages in
denying that they have any fiduciary obligation when push comes to shove in
an arbitration case filed by investors who have lost some or all of their nest
egg due to conflicted advice.
In this atmosphere of misleading advertising and a complete disavowal by
brokerage firms of the same ad claims in arbitration, investor losses will
continue to mount at the rate of nearly $20 billion per year until the SEC and
DOL prescribe the long-overdue remedy: a “fiduciary duty” standard banning
conflicted advice.
Introduction
Currently, there is no national standard requiring brokerage firms to put
investors’ interest in preserving their nest eggs over brokerage firms’ interest
in making money from those investors’ accounts. According to a recent study,
every year that goes by without a rule that requires brokers to put investors’
interests first costs American investors another $17 billion.1 Dodd- Frank,
passed five years ago, mandated that the Securities & Exchange Commission
(the “SEC”) study this issue. During the course of the last five years without a
SEC rule, inaction on the issue has cost investors nearly $80 billion.2
The problem continues to grow worse as more and more Americans lose
their defined benefit plans and, instead, roll their life savings into IRAs,3 which
they must invest for their future. A critical component of the problem is the
brokerage industry’s marketing efforts to convince investors they absolutely
require the assistance of brokers to protect their retirement savings. The Public

1. See “The Effects of Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement Savings,”
February 2015, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_
coi_report _final.pdf.
2. See id. $17 billion times 4.6 years since the passage of Dodd-Frank equals $79.22
billion.
3. Beginning in the 1970s and continuing through the end of 2013, the number of
Americans covered by a traditional pension plan was cut in half while the number of
Americans depending on 401(k)s and IRAs more than doubled. See “The Effects of
Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement Savings,” February 2015, p.5 available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf.
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Investors Arbitration Bar Association (“PIABA”)4 has a conducted a study to
determine whether brokerage firms advertise like they have a duty to put
investors interests first, but when called to account for their actions, litigate
like they have no such duty.
The results are striking. Firms routinely advertise themselves as giving
personalized, ongoing, non-conflicted advice that puts the customer first.
Brokerage firms have also taken the position publicly with the regulators that
such a duty should exist. But, when called to account for their actions, these
same brokerage firms litigate like they have no such duty. This highlights the
need for a national, strong fiduciary duty that holds firms to the standard they
advertise to the public and articulate to the regulators.
The lack of a national fiduciary standard is not just an abstract
philosophical question. The lack of such a standard has real-world implications
for investors, like Ethel Sprouse. Ms. Sprouse is a baby boomer from Cedar
Bluff, Alabama. Her husband suffers from Alzheimer’s disease. Her adult
daughter is mentally disabled and lives in a group home. Ms. Sprouse and her
husband are unsophisticated investors and, like most, entrusted their retirement
savings to a trusted financial adviser, who in the Sprouses’ case was a
registered representative of Allstate Financial (“Allstate”). As her husband’s
mental capacity and daughter’s health diminished, the financial strain on the
family increased and Ms. Sprouse’s reliance on Allstate to provide her with
sound financial advice grew even more crucial. In 2007, the Sprouses
transferred all of their life savings to Allstate so that it could be managed by
one trusted firm. In short, Allstate used the trust placed in them and invested
virtually all of the Sprouses’ nest egg into a non-diversified portfolio of stocks,
which objectively is very risky and unsuitable for most investors. As a result,
Mr. and Mrs. Sprouse lost approximately $400,000 and the Sprouses sued
Allstate in arbitration5 to recover their losses. The arbitration case is currently
pending.

4. PIABA is a national, not-for-profit bar association comprised of more than 450
attorneys, including law school professors and former regulators, who devote a
significant portion of their practice to the representation of public investors in
securities arbitration.
5. Allstate included a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clause in its brokerage
agreement with Mr. and Mrs. Sprouse. As result, the Sprouses are unable to seek the
help of a court or a jury of their peers, but rather, had no choice other than to file an
arbitration administrated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (which is
owned by the very brokerage firms customers such as the Sprouses sue) to seek a
recovery of their losses.
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For decades, Allstate’s marketing success has been based on the principle
that they put their clients’ interest first. The “You’re In Good Hands” slogan
is one of the most prolific in U.S. history. Indeed, while the Sprouses’
retirement savings were invested with Allstate, every monthly account
statement contained the “Good Hands” recognizable symbol and phrase of
trust. However, as illustrated below, when sued, Allstate’s legal position is it
owed no fiduciary duty to the Sprouses. This report will first review the current
landscape of the differing standards of duty that apply to brokerage firms and
investment advisors and the SEC and Department of Labor’s (DOL) efforts to
harmonize those duties. The report then discusses a number of firms’ public
positions and advertisements regarding their commitment to act in investors’
best interest contrasted with their litigation strategy of denying that any such
duty exists. The report concludes that the SEC and DOL should hold brokerage
firms to their public statements and remove all doubt that brokerage firms must
put investors’ interest first.
The Current Landscape: Investment Adviser and Broker Duties
Investment advice is provided to investors by two different types of
financial advisors:
Investment Advisers and Brokers. Each is subject to different regulatory
regimes, although there is some overlap in those who enforce the regulations.
Investment Advisers are subject to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the
“Advisers Act”) and the rules promulgated thereunder as well as state statutes
and regulations. The SEC and the state securities regulators enforce those
statutes and regulations. Brokers are governed by the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and the rules promulgated thereunder as well as
by state statutes and regulations. In addition, Brokers are regulated by the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), a self-regulatory
organization and are subject to the rules promulgated by FINRA.6
Investment Advisers must adhere to a fiduciary duty standard, which is
derived from judicial interpretations of the Advisers Act. The fiduciary duty is
generally defined by case law to include the duty of loyalty and care, and the
obligation to always put the client’s interests before and above the Investment
Advisor’s own interests when the Advisor interacts with a client. Brokers,
instead of a fiduciary standard, must adhere to a suitability standard which is
6. Both brokers and investment advisers are subject to the various states’ common
law regarding the imposition of fiduciary duty. The patchwork of inconsistent state
laws on the subject only serves to highlight the critical need for a national standard.
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premised on a FINRA rule that requires a Broker to have a reasonable basis
for believing a recommendation of a security or an investment strategy is
“suitable” for a client, based on the client’s investment profile.
Although both Investment Advisers and Brokers are regulated extensively,
the differences in these regulatory regimes lead to different results for
investors. Investors generally are not aware of these differences or their legal
implications. Many investors are also confused by the different standards of
care that apply to Investment Advisers and Brokers, and many do not even
know with which type of investment professional with whom they are doing
business. Investors believe their financial advisor, be the title “broker” or
“investment adviser,” is acting in their best interest. That confusion has been
a source of concern for regulators and Congress. Section 913 of Title IX of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the
“Dodd-Frank Act”) required the SEC to conduct a study to evaluate:
 The effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of care
(imposed by the Commission, a national securities association, and other
federal or state authorities) for providing personalized investment advice
and recommendations about securities to retail customers; and
 Whether there are legal or regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps in
legal or regulatory standards in the protection of retail customers relating
to the standards of care for providing personalized investment advice
about securities to retail customers that should be addressed by rule or
statute.7
Proposed Changes
In January 2011, the Staff of the SEC issued its report to Congress
following the study it conducted pursuant to section 913 of Dodd-Frank. The
Staff made the following recommendation:
The Commission should engage in rulemaking to implement the
uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for broker-dealers and
investment advisers when providing personalized investment advice
about securities to retail customers. Specifically, the Staff
recommends that the uniform fiduciary standard of conduct
established by the Commission should provide that:

7. See “Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers,” Executive Summary, p. i,
January 2011, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
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the standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and investment
advisers, when providing personalized investment advice about
securities to retail customers (and such other customers as the
Commission may by rule provide), shall be to act in the best interests
of the customer without regard to the financial or other interests of the
broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the advice.8
The Staff interpreted this uniform fiduciary standard to encompass the
duties of loyalty and care as interpreted and developed under the Advisers Act
Sections 206(1) and 206(2).9
Between 2011 and 2013, the SEC did not issue any rules in furtherance of
the Staff’s recommendations. Instead, in March 2013, two years after the staff
recommendation, the SEC sought further data and other information, noting it
had not yet decided whether to commence rulemaking.10
SEC Commissioner Perspectives
PIABA believes that the SEC should commence rule-making
immediately, clarifying the existence and extent of the fiduciary duty and
thereby holding brokerage firms to the standards of conduct they advertise to
the public. Commissioners White and Aguilar have both expressed support for
rulemaking that would stop brokerage firms from marketing like they have a
duty to put investors first and litigating like no such duty exists.11

8. See “Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers,” pp. 109–10, January
2011, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf.
9. See id. at p. 111.
10. See “Duties of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment Advisers,” SEC Release No.
34069013, p. 9, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2013/34-69013.pdf.
11. Chairman White has recently expressed her view on the subject. She recently stated
that the SEC should “implement a uniform fiduciary duty for broker-dealers and
investment advisers where the standard is to act in the best interest of the investor.”
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-17/sec-will-develop-fiduciaryduty-rule-forbrokers-white-says
Commissioner Aguilar has been strongly in support of adoption of a fiduciary duty for
Brokers: “I am issuing this statement to be clear as to my position — it is in the best
interests of investors and our markets for broker-dealers who provide investment
advice to be held to the fiduciary standard that is currently applied to investment
advisers.” Statement by SEC Commissioner: Statement in Support of Extending a
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Commissioner Stein has not clearly articulated her stance on a uniform
fiduciary rule, but has expressed support for aligning the interests of brokers
and investors, which underlies a part of a uniform fiduciary rule.12
Commissioners Gallagher and Piwowar have both stated that they believe
more study is necessary.13
The Department of Labor Action
The Department of Labor has examined the role Brokers and Investment
Advisers play in the management of retirement accounts. In 2010, the DOL
proposed a rule under ERISA broadly defining the circumstances under which
a person is considered to be a ‘‘fiduciary’’ by reason of giving investment

Fiduciary Duty to Broker-Dealers who Provide Investment Advice, May 11, 2010,
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch051110 laa.htm.
12. Commissioner Stein explained her position as follows:
No doubt, disclosure remains the heart of our investor protection regime. But
we also know from experience that sometimes it isn’t enough – or to put it
another way, that it works better under some conditions than others. What are
the conditions under which it works best? Basically, where we have done
everything we can to align those interests that should naturally be aligned.
When interests are aligned, there are fewer incentives to play games, and
better results for ordinary investors, who can make straight-forward, smart
decisions… On the market participant side, we have professional standards
and rules to ensure that investment advisers’ and broker-dealers’ interests are
appropriately aligned – or at least, not misaligned – with the investors they
serve… Are our rules in all of these areas perfect? No. Is there a lot to be
done and improved? Absolutely. For example, the Commission is in the midst
of considering how to better align the interests of broker-dealers with the
investors they serve. It’s an important area, and I’m looking forward to seeing
progress made.
Remarks Before the Consumer Federation of America’s 27th Annual Financial
Services Conference, December 4, 2014, available at http://www.sec.gov/News/
Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543593434#.VO5nGfnF8Yk.
13. See Remarks at the 2014 SRO Outreach Conference, September 16, 2014,
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542969623#.VO
5lkPnF8Yk; Remarks at the National Association of Plan Advisors D.C. Fly-In Forum,
September 30, 2014, available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370543077131#.VO5pJfnF8Yk.
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advice to an employee benefit plan or a plan’s participants.14 The DOL
encountered fierce industry opposition from the very brokerage firms that
advertise their personalized service, received extensive comments on the rule
proposal, and withdrew the proposal in order to conduct further analysis.15
The DOL is in the process of reintroducing the rule proposal to require
that those providing retirement investment advice act in the best interest of
investors.16 The DOL cited to a study by the White House Council of
Economic Advisers to explain the harms faced by investors as a result of
conflicted investment advice:
Based on extensive review of independent research, the White House
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) has concluded that conflicted
advice causes affected savers to earn returns that are roughly 1
percentage point lower each year (for example, a 5 percent return
absent conflicts would become a 6 percent return). As a result, a retiree
who receives conflicted advice when rolling over a 401(k) balance to
an IRA at retirement will lose an estimated 12 percent of the value of
his or her savings if drawn down over 30 years. If a retiree receiving
conflicted advice takes withdrawals at the rate possible absent
conflicted advice, his or her savings would run out more than 5 years
earlier. Since conflicted advice affects an estimated $1.7 trillion of
IRA assets, the aggregate annual cost of conflicted advice is about $17
billion each year.17
The DOL has submitted the rule proposal to the OMB’s Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) for a standard interagency
review, after which it will publish a “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking”
(“NPRM”).

14. See “Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary”,” 29 CFR Part 2510, available at
http://webapps.dol.gov/Federal Register/PdfDisplay.aspx?DocId=24328.
15. See Department of Labor, “FAQs: Conflicts of Interest Rulemaking,” available at
http://www.dol.gov/featured/ ProtectYourSavings/faqs.htm.
16. See Department of Labor, “FAQs: Conflicts of Interest Rulemaking,” available at
http://www.dol.gov/featured/ ProtectYourSavings/faqs.htm.
17. See Department of Labor, “FAQs: Conflicts of Interest Rulemaking,” available at
http://www.dol.gov/featured /ProtectYourSavings/faqs.htm. See also “The Effects of
Conflicted Investment Advice on Retirement Savings,” February 2015, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf.
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Brokerage Firms Advertise Like They Offer Ongoing
Personalized Service That Puts the Investor First, But Deny Any
Such Duty When Called To Account For Their Actions
There is a striking difference between the positions brokerage firms take
when soliciting customers and those they take when those customers arbitrate
claims against the same firms. Set forth below are various firms’
proclamations to the public set forth in advertisements contrasted with those
firms’ arguments set forth to FINRA arbitrators. On one hand, the firms boast
that they offer unconflicted, trustworthy advice while, on the other hand, those
same firms argue they are little more than salesmen with a single duty: to
execute trades in customers’ accounts.
________________________
ALLSTATE
Allstate Tells The Public That Investors are “In Good Hands.”

The Allstate slogan “You’re in good hands” was created a half century ago
by Allstate Insurance Company’s sales executive David Ellis to demonstrate
Allstate’s ongoing commitment to customers. The phrase came to him as the
result of a reassuring remark made to his wife during the Spring of 1950 about
their ailing child. She told him, “The hospital said not to worry. We’re in good
hands with the doctor.” A study announced in September 2000 by
Northwestern University’s Medill Graduate Department of Integrated
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Marketing Communications found that the Allstate slogan “You’re in good
hands” ranked as the most recognizable in America.18
Ethel Sprouse trusted Allstate and its financial adviser. She believed that
they were required to put her interests first. Indeed, while Allstate managed
the Sprouses’ retirement savings, every monthly account statement contained
the above illustrated recognizable symbol and phrase of trust.
Allstate Tells Arbitrators That Good
Hands Owe No Fiduciary Duty
Notwithstanding Allstate’s famous slogan, when Ms. Sprouse sued
Allstate in FINRA arbitration after her trusted Allstate financial advisor
breached their trust relationship and lost approximately $400,000 of the
Sprouses’ life savings, Allstate raised the defense that “Állstate Financial
Services owed no fiduciary duty to Claimants, and, therefore, no such duty
was breached.”19
________________________
UBS
UBS Tells The Public That the Client Comes First
“Until my client knows she comes first. Until I understand what drives her.
And what slows her down. Until I know what makes her leap out of bed in the
morning. And what keeps her awake at night. Until she understands that I’m
always thinking about her investment. (Even if she isn’t.) Not at the office. But
at the opera. At a barbecue. In a traffic jam. Until her ambitions feel like my
ambitions. Until then. We will not rest. UBS.” (Emphasis in advertisement.)20

18. See http://www.adslogans.co.uk/site/pages/gallery/youre-in-good-hands-with-all
state.8355.php.
19. See Ex. 1. Also included in the exhibit is a copy of the Sprouses’ Statement of
Claim that served as the basis for the Answer.
20. See Ex. 2.
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UBS Tells Regulators That The Client Does Not Come First
UBS, like many other firms, ignores the representations in its advertising
when it is forced to defend its actions. “[A] broker does not owe a fiduciary
duty to his customer in a nondiscretionary account.”21
________________________
Morgan Stanley Tells The Public That
It Provides a Personalized Plan
“Having an intimate knowledge of blue chips and small caps is important.
But even more important is an intimate knowledge of you and your goals. Get
connected to a Morgan Stanley Financial Advisor and get a more personalized
plan for achieving success.”22 Morgan Stanley Tells Arbitrators That Its
Personalized Plans Can Put The Firm’s Interests Ahead of Clients’ Despite
representing that personalized plans would be used, Morgan Stanley says it
will only have a fiduciary duty when the service goes beyond the plan and
includes Morgan Stanley taking over the trading in an account on a
discretionary basis. “There is no fiduciary duty where, as here, the client
maintains a non-discretionary brokerage account.”23
“Claimants claim of breach of fiduciary duty fails as a matter of law and
should be dismissed in its entirety. Claimant’s claim seeks to impose
‘fiduciary’ obligations and duties on Respondents that only arise in very
limited circumstances that do not exist here, i.e. where Respondents are given
discretionary trading authority over Claimant’s accounts.”24
________________________

21. See Ex. 3.
22. See Ex. 4.
23. See Ex. 5.
24. See Ex. 6.
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BERTHEL FISHER
Berthel Fisher Tells The Public That It Maintains the
“Highest Standard of Integrity.”
“We are committed to maintaining the highest standards of integrity and
professionalism in our relationship with you, our client. We endeavor to know
and understand your financial situation and provide you with only the highest
quality information and services to help you reach your goals.”25
Berthel Fisher Tells Arbitrators That the “Highest Standard of
Integrity” Does Not Include a Duty to Put Investors First
While “highest standard of integrity” certainly sounds like a representation
that a clients’ interests will be put first, Berthel Fisher says it does not owe a
fiduciary duty to clients. “Respondents deny that they owed fiduciary duties to
Claimants.”26
________________________
AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL
Ameriprise Financial Tells The Public That Its Advisors are
Ethically Obligated To Act With Your Best Interests At Heart.”
“Focus on your dreams and goals
“Once you’ve identified your dreams and goals, and you and the advisor
have decided to work together, you can count on sound recommendations that
address your goals. You’ll be able to clearly see and discuss how the actions
and decisions you make today will affect your tomorrow. You can expect to
hear about the options you have and any underlying factors to consider. Our
advisors are ethically obligated to act with your best interests at heart.”27

25. See http://www.kevinyaley.com/!CustomPage.cfm?PageID=1&disclaimer=acc
ept.
26. See Ex. 7.
27. From the Ameriprise Financial website, Our Advisors, “What to expect from an
Ameriprise financial advisor,” http://www.ameriprise.com/financial-planning/
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“Personalized advice and recommendations on an ongoing basis
“Perhaps the best thing about working with a personal financial advisor is
that your financial plan is custom made for you. The financial advisor you
choose to work with knows all about you. When and if you experience a life
change, your priorities shift or you have a pressing financial question, you can
contact your advisor for information and financial advice that’s meaningful to
you. You may meet a few times during a year and have several discussions.
Your advisor will make every effort to be available to you when needed.”28
Ameriprise Financial Tells Regulators That It
Advocates For A Uniform Fiduciary Duty
Ameriprise has publicly told the SEC that it supports the imposition of a
fiduciary duty on brokers, such as Ameriprise. “Our business has been built on
a financial planning model with personalized investment advisory services at
its core. Our experience in offering retail advice under the Advisers Act, with
its enhanced disclosure requirements and other investor protections, has led us
to advocate for a uniform fiduciary standard throughout the recent legislative
process and endorse SIFMA’s support of a uniform fiduciary standard of
conduct for broker-dealers and investment advisers providing personalized
advice about securities to retail clients.”29
Ameriprise Financial Tells Arbitrators That It
Doesn’t Believe this Duty Exists
Despite is advertising campaign promising to put client interests first and
even publicly supporting and acknowledging a belief that a fiduciary duty is
required, Ameriprise has nevertheless argued in arbitration it owes no such

ameriprise-financialadvisors/financial-advisor-expectations.asp, last visited February
25, 2015.
28. From the Ameriprise Financial website, Our Advisors, “What to expect from an
Ameriprise financial advisor,” http://www.ameriprise.com/financial-planning/
ameriprise-financialadvisors/financial-advisor-expectations.asp, last visited February
25, 2015.
29. Ameriprise Financial, Inc. Letter to the SEC dated August 30, 2010, available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/ 4-606/4606-2640.pdf.
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duty. “Respondent owed no fiduciary duties to Claimants and, even if it did,
no such duties were breached.”30
________________________
MERRILL LYNCH
Merrill Lynch Tells The Public That It
Puts Investors “Needs Front and Center”
“It’s time for a financial strategy that puts your needs and priorities front
and center.
“Adapting the approach as life changes and goals are reached. As goals
and priorities change, so should your approach.”32
“Our organization has all the tools and technology and ease of use that you
would want. But ultimately, the real measure is when you sit down with your
advisor and build that trusting relationship… and at any time you know exactly
where you stand… when you think about progress towards what it is you want
to accomplish with your… finances and with your money.
“Our entire company’s purpose is to help you achieve the best life for
yourself, and for your family. And this purpose, to making life better extends
even further to our communities and beyond. We’re proud of our company.
We want you to be proud of it as well, and for you to value your relationship
with us.”33

30. See Ex. 8.
31. [sic] Footnote omitted from original report.
32. From the Merrill Lynch website, Working with Us, “From a Conversation to a
Relationship,” https://www.ml.com/life-goals.html, last visited February 25, 2015.
33. From the Merrill Lynch website, Working with Us, “From a Conversation to a
Relationship,” John Thiel, the head of Merrill Lynch Wealth Management, on what
makes working with Merrill Lynch so different, https://mlaem.fs.ml.com/content/
dam/ML/working-with-us/pdfs/transcriptlife-goals-thiel.pdf, last visited February 25,
2015.
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Merrill Lynch34 Tells Regulators That It
Supports A Uniform Fiduciary Duty
“Bank of America supports applying a new, harmonized standard of care
to all financial professionals providing personalized investment advice to
individual investors. In particular, we believe that both broker-dealers and
investment advisers giving personalized investment advice to individual
investors should be subject to a fiduciary duty that is clearly prescribed. We
further believe that any new fiduciary standard of care should be applied in a
manner that both enhances investor protection and preserves the availability
of choices for clients. Informed client choice is critical to ensuring that
investment objectives are attained.35
Merrill Lynch Tells Arbitrators That It Has No
Duty to Put Investors “Front and Center”
Despites marketing that clients’ interest would be “front and center” and a
desire to “build a trusting relationship” as well as publicly supporting the
imposition of a fiduciary duty, Merrill Lynch has refused to acknowledge it
owes a fiduciary duty in arbitration when it breaches that duty to investors.
“The Second Circuit ruled that in a non-discretionary securities account, there
is no ongoing duty of reasonable care that requires a brokerage firm to give
advice or monitor information beyond the limited transaction-by-transaction
duties that are implicated in executing its customer’s instructions.”36
“Respondents did not stand in a fiduciary relationship with Claimants.”37
_______________________

34. Bank of America purchased Merrill Lynch in the fall of 2008 and Merrill Lynch is
therefore now a division of Bank of America Corp.
35. Bank of America Corp. Letter to the SEC dated August 30, 2010, available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-2583.pdf.
36. See Ex. 9.
37. See id.
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FIDELITY INVESTMENTS
Fidelity Investments Tells The Public That It
Puts Investors’ “Interests Before Our Own”
“Acting in good faith and taking pride in getting things just right. The
personal commitment each of us makes to go the extra mile for our customers
and put their interests before our own is a big part of what has always made
Fidelity a special place to work and do business. With millions relying on us
for their savings or the growth of their business, we handle every action and
decision with integrity and personal attention to detail. Getting things just right
doesn’t mean we’re perfect, but rather setting high standards, refusing to cut
corners, and believing that every product, every experience, and every
outcome can always be better.”38
Fidelity Investments Tells Regulators That It
Supports A Uniform Fiduciary Duty
“Fidelity supports a uniform fiduciary duty for broker-dealers and
investment advisers that would require broker-dealers and investment advisers
to act in the best interest of retail customers when offering personalized
investment advice about securities to such retail customers.”39
Fidelity Tells Arbitrators That It Denies Any Duty To
Put Investors’ Interests Before Their Own
Even though Fidelity Investments markets that it will put investors’
interests before its own and has publicly supported a fiduciary standard for
brokerage firms, Fidelity has argued no such duty exists when defending itself
in arbitrations with customers. “Claimants first claim fails because Fidelity did
not owe [the investors] any fiduciary duty.”40
38. From the Fidelity Investments website, About Fidelity, “Our Purpose and
Standards,” https://www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/our-purpose-standards, last
visited February 25, 2015.
39. Fidelity Investments Letter to the SEC dated July 5, 2013, available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-3117.pdf.
40. See Ex. 10.
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________________________
WELLS FARGO
Wells Fargo Tells The Public That Investors
“Feel that Your Best Interests are the Top Priority”
“Are we working toward common goals? A healthy relationship with
your Financial Advisor should make you feel that your best interests are the
top priority, no matter what is happening in the market and no matter the size
of your portfolio. Furthermore, you should like your advisor, and both you and
your advisor should feel that all concerns are heard and addressed.”41
“Are we sharing information and asking questions? Your financial
consultant should provide you with the relevant information needed to help
you feel informed about financial events that pertain to your investments. Your
Financial Advisor may also answer any questions you might have about your
monthly statements. Stay in contact to ensure that your advisor is current on
your objectives and can make changes when necessary.”42
Wells Fargo Tells Regulators That It
Supports A Uniform Fiduciary Duty
“Wells Fargo fully supports the adoption of a uniform federal fiduciary
duty standard for broker dealers when providing personalized investment
advice regarding securities to retail clients. Properly implemented, such a
standard will enhance protections for clients, preserve the opportunities for
clients to select the level of service and type of relationship they desire, allow
clients of all levels of sophistication and resources to be fully served and foster
competition in the industry.”43

41. From the Wells Fargo Advisors website, Working With a Financial Advisor, “How
to Evaluate a Financial Advisor,” https://www.wellsfargoadvisors.com/financialadvisor/articles/evaluatefinancial-advisor.htm, last visited February 25, 2015.
42. See id.
43. Wells Fargo & Co. Letter to the SEC dated August 30, 2010, available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-2592.pdf.
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Wells Fargo Tells Arbitrators To Forget About Feelings,
The Firm Is Not Required to Consider Investors’ Interest First
Ignoring that it markets itself as making investors feel their “best interests
are the top priority” and that Wells Fargo has even publicly supported the need
for a uniform fiduciary duty, in private arbitrations, Wells Fargo has refused
to acknowledge owing a fiduciary duty. “The law establishes that a broker does
not owe a fiduciary duty to a customer with respect to a nondiscretionary
account.”44
________________________
CHARLES SCHWAB
Charles Schwab Tells The Public That Its Brokers Are Proactive
“For many years, we’ve encouraged investors like you to “Talk to Chuck”
so we could help you manage through the array of investing challenges and
opportunities. I still encourage you to do that. We’ll share with you our passion
for investing and our thoughts on how to do it well, and we’ll listen to you to
understand how we can help you reach your goals. But going forward, you’ll
be hearing more about the values we stand for and why they might matter to
you. Our communications will emphasize the fundamental belief we share
with you: a belief that through personal engagement and a relationship of
mutual respect, your financial goals and a better tomorrow are within reach.”45
“Does my broker discuss the risks in my investment portfolio?
“All investors need to understand the various risks in their investment
portfolio and their tolerance level for those risks. But, how much and how
often do you discuss these risks with your broker? Is your broker proactive
about communicating possible risks as things change in the markets, economy
or in your personal situation?”46

44. See Ex. 11.
45. From the Schwab website, Why Choose Schwab, “An Open Letter from Chuck,”
http://www.schwab.com/public/file/P-6083252/Chuck_Open_Letter.pdf, last visited
February 25, 2015.
46. From the Schwab website, Own Your Tomorrow, “Stay Engaged Questions,”
http://content.schwab.com/corporate/own-your-tomorrow/#Stay-Engaged-Questions,
last visited February 25, 2015.
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Charles Schwab Tells Regulators That The
Customers’ Interests Should Come First
“Given the narrow area of overlap, the Commission should consider a
straight-forward rule, simply tracking the language of Dodd-Frank Section
913(g)(1):
“The standard of conduct” when providing non-discretionary
“personalized investment advice about securities to a retail customer”
for a commission or other transaction-based compensation is “to act
in the best interest of the customer without regard to the financial or
other interest of the broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the
advice.””47
Charles Schwab Tells Arbitrators That
Customers’ Interests Do Not Come First.
Even though Charles Schwab told regulators that personalized investment
advice provided in exchange for a commission should require the broker to act
in the best interest of a customer without regard to the broker’s own financial
interest, it takes a very different approach when pleading its case to the
arbitrators. “Where a customer maintains a non-discretionary account, a
broker-dealer’s duties are quite limited. A broker does not, in the ordinary
course of business, owe a fiduciary duty to a purchaser of securities.”50
Why Wouldn’t Investors Want A Uniform Fiduciary Rule?
In the above advertisements, brokerage firms consistently acknowledge
that investors want, expect and need for brokerage firms to put their interests
first. However, when the reality of the imposition of a fiduciary duty is
evaluated, broker firms have changed their story and often argued that such a
47. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. Letter to the SEC dated July 5, 2013, available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-3137.pdf.
48. [sic] Footnote omitted from original report.
49. [sic] Footnote omitted from original report.
50. Ex. 12.
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duty would actually harm investors. If some representatives of the brokerage
industry are to be believed, the imposition of a national fiduciary duty would
result in higher costs for investors and a barrier to low-income investors’
access to brokerage advice. For example, the National Association of Plan
Advisors (“NAPA”), a securities industry advocacy group, claims that a
“conflict of interest” rule is really a “no advice” rule. In other words, according
to NAPA, prohibiting conflicts of interests would “block Americans from
working with the financial advisors and investment providers they trust simply
because they offer different financial products – like annuities and mutual
funds – with different fees.”51
NAPA continues: “This rule could even restrict who can help you with
your 401(k) rollover.” The situation would be particularly dire, according to a
2011 study prepared by Oliver Wyman Inc. in response to the DOL’s first
attempt to propose a uniform fiduciary standard.52
According to the abstract of the report, IRAs are widely held by small
investors, who overwhelmingly favor brokerage relationships over advisory
ones, and the proposed rule would prohibit 7.2 million current IRAs from
receiving investment advice thanks to account minimums.53
Further, the study claims that costs for brokerage IRA customers would
increase between 75% and 195%.54
Actual data, as opposed to the rhetoric and hyperbole, demonstrates that
the imposition of a fiduciary duty upon brokers has no meaningful impact on
cost to investors or access to investment advice.55
In fact, differences in state broker-dealer common law standards of care
have been tested to determine whether a relatively stricter fiduciary standard
of care affects the ability to provide services to customers, and it was found
that there is no statistical difference in the brokers’ ability to provide services
51. “White House Rule Could Block 401(k) Participants from Advice,” available at
http://asppanews.org/2015/02/23/white-house-rule-could-block-401k-participantsfrom-advice/
52. The report was submitted to DOL by Davis & Harman LLP on April 12, 2011, on
behalf of twelve financial services firms that offer services to retail investors. The
cover letter and report can be found at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/WymanStudy
041211.pdf.
53. See id. at p. 2.
54. See id.
55. Finke, Michael S. and Langdon, Thomas Patrick, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer
Fiduciary Standard on Financial Advice (March 9, 2012). Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2019090 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2019090.
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to higher or lower wealth clients, or their ability to provide a broad range of
products including those that provide commissioned compensation. There was
also no difference in the ability to provide tailored advice. And, perhaps most
cuttingly for the industry’s argument – there was no difference in the cost of
compliance.
Given that the imposition of a uniform fiduciary rule neither affects access
to investment advice nor increases costs, it is clear that the rule stands to
benefit investors in a meaningful way by prohibiting conflicted investment
advice.
Conclusion
Billions each year slip through the fingers of American investors because
of the conflicted investment advice they receive. The SEC and DOL must take
action to force brokerage firms to live up to the standard that they market to
investors rather than the one brokerage firms argue when they have wronged
those same investors. Brokerage firms advertise that they put customers’
interests first, offer personalized advice and do all of this on an ongoing basis.
In other words, they advertise that they are a fiduciary such as a doctor or
lawyer. But, when a dispute arises with investors, brokerage firms consistently
argue they have the duties of a used car salesman. SEC and DOL action for a
strong, national fiduciary standard is the only way to protect investors’ hardearned retirement savings by holding firms to the image they themselves
present.

